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Abstract
The effect of social capital is often overrated because contacts and centrality can be a 
consequence of success rather than its cause. Randomized or natural experiments are 
an excellent way to assess the real causal effect of social capital, but these are rare. This 
paper relies on data from one such experiment: recruitment at the EHESS, a leading so-
cial science institution in France, between 1960 and 2005. The EHESS recruitment pro-
cess uses an electoral commission to produce a first-stage ranking of applicants, which 
is then provided to the faculty assembly for final voting. The commission is partly com-
posed of faculty members drawn at random, a feature that this article exploits in order 
to compare the chances for success of applicants whose contacts have been drawn  to 
sit on the commission (treated) versus those whose contacts have not been drawn (con-
trol). It shows that a contact such as a PhD advisor has a causal impact, especially for 
assistant professor hiring exams: it doubles the chance of being ranked and increases 
the share of votes by 10 percent. This phenomenon may explain part of the classic “aca-
demic inbreeding” issue.
Author
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The Chance of Influence: A Natural Experiment on the Role 
of Social Capital in Academic Hiring
What has remained, however, and indeed has considerably increased, 
is a factor peculiar to the university career. Whether or not an adjunct 
lecturer, let alone an assistant, ever succeeds in achieving the position 
of a full professor, let alone of a head of an institute, is a matter of pure 
chance. Of course, chance is not the only factor, but it is an usually 
powerful factor. (Weber 2008: 28)
The importance of networks and contacts in getting a job (Granovetter 1973, 1974) is 
one of sociology’s most famous propositions. Indeed, labor surveys have shown repeat-
edly that an important fraction of the population cites contacts as the reason they were 
hired (Granovetter 1995): in the United States in 1975, 27 percent of male respondents 
in the Current Population Survey reported that they had found their job through per-
sonal contacts (Granovetter 1995). In France, in 1994 (Forsé 2000), 26 percent of Labor 
Force Survey respondents who had been in a job for less than a year declared that they 
had found this job through contacts, either family contacts (6 percent) or personal ones 
(20 percent).
Nevertheless, empirical studies provide rather mixed evidence on the importance of 
contacts in general and weak ties in particular for finding a job more quickly or acquir-
ing a better-paid or more highly respected position. Some studies have found that weak 
ties matter (Yakubovich 2005; Fernandez/Weinberg 1997; Lin/Ensel/Vaughn 1981), an 
effect that is either a consequence of information gleaned from weak ties about job 
opportunities (Yakubovich 2005; Fernandez/Weinberg 1997) or a consequence of indi-
rect influence on people in charge of recruitment decisions (Lin/Ensel/Vaughn 1981). 
Other studies, on the other hand, have underlined the importance of strong ties, for 
instance in a poorly competitive labor market such as China (Obukhova 2012; Bian 
1997). People in charge of recruitment may therefore have great motivation to use their 
discretionary power in favor of the closest candidates. But studies based on large sam-
ples are much less confident about the causal impact of contacts on job opportunities. 
The first-order correlation between job contacts and professional outcome disappears 
once the authors introduce a set of elementary controls and test the relation beyond the 
subsample of white upper-class males (Bridges/Villemez 1986) or the trivial correlation 
between the characteristics of individuals and the characteristics of their contacts is 
taken into account (Mouw 2003).
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Mouw’s survey on the causal effects of social capital (2006) generalizes his 2003 negative 
results about the absence of a link between contacts and job outcomes. Most statistical 
estimations consider network measures as exogenous and neglect two classic sources 
of bias, unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. These biases are more likely to 
occur with network variables and can lead to substantial overestimation of the impact 
of networks. Mouw forcefully advocates for methods, such as natural experiments and 
randomized experiment techniques, that can best circumvent such statistical problems. 
Randomized experiments are expensive and difficult to implement for most real-life 
situations such as recruitment. We don’t find many beyond the issues that are the most 
linked to public policies and to development economics (Banerjee/Duflo 2011). Natu-
ral experiments are unfortunately rare. This article presents data from such an experi-
ment, on the recruitment of scholars at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences So-
ciales (EHESS), a leading French institution of higher education in the social sciences, 
enabling us to estimate the precise causal effect of social capital. The EHESS hiring 
procedure requires that a significant proportion of the electoral commission – the com-
mittee initially ranking the applicants – is drawn at random from the faculty of this 
institution. Thanks to this random component, we can apply the classical experimental 
feature comparing the outcomes of two groups: a) the treated group, i.e., the applicants 
whose contact has been randomly drawn; and b) the control group, i.e., the applicants 
whose contact, although eligible, has not been randomly drawn. The difference in out-
come between these two groups informs us about the effect of having a social contact 
on the committee. This article shows that when one of the randomly drawn committee 
members is the PhD advisor for a given candidate, it doubles the odds of that candidate 
being put forward for recruitment by the electoral commission. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the first section details the shortcom-
ings of classical estimations of the causal impact of social capital. The second section 
establishes links between the EHESS study and previous studies on the academic labor 
market. The third section presents the data and the method. Results are presented in 
the fourth section, followed by a discussion on the limitations and scope of the results. 
1 Natural experiments on social capital
In network sociology, it has been very common since the work of Granovetter (1974) 
and Burt (1992) to use a basic regression analysis to try to explain an outcome (getting 
a job or a promotion, level of pay or pay increase) through the use of social capital vari-
ables. Those social capital variables can be either the “who” type of social capital (who 
you know, a specific contact) or the “where” type of social capital (where you are in the 
network in terms of centrality, structural constraint, etc.). 
Godechot: The Chance of Influence 3
Mouw (2006) concentrates his criticism on the “who” type of social capital. Building 
on the work of the econometrician Manski (1993) on peer effects, he shows that regres-
sions seeking to evaluate the influence of a specific contact are particularly vulnerable 
to the “reflection problem.” Since homophily is considered to be a universal feature 
of social relationships (McPherson/Smith-Lovin/Cook 2001), one can expect a strong 
correlation between an individual’s characteristics and those of their contact, both on 
observable dimensions (which can be controlled for in regressions) and unobservable 
dimensions (which cannot be controlled for). This unobserved heterogeneity may lead 
researchers to overestimate the impact of having a contact.
Let us consider an example. In Combes, Linnemer and Visser (2008), the authors test 
how applicant rankings in economics in the Agrégation du supérieur, a national com-
petitive exam for university professors, are affected by links applicants may have to 
members of the hiring committee, for example the presence of a former PhD advisor, a 
coauthor, or a member of the same department on the committee. They find a strong 
correlation between such links and the probability of an applicant being hired. Since 
members of the committee are chosen by the French government, however, they pre-
sumably are talented in their field, and the homophilic patterns of relationships would 
suggest that their contacts (especially former PhD candidates) are similarly talented. 
The authors do control for talent variables, for instance the number and quality of pub-
lications by both applicants and their respective advisors, or the possession of a position 
or PhD from one of the top six universities for economics in France. Nevertheless, the 
teaching talent that also strongly contributes to the exam result remains unobserved in 
the study. If members of the jury are talented teachers and are assortatively matched 
with contacts equally talented on that dimension, the coefficient of the tie variable could 
serve more to measure this unobserved talent than to measure the causal effect of hav-
ing a tie in the jury. The importance of social capital could therefore be overestimated.
It’s true that Mouw does not discuss much of the “where” type of social capital, a term 
that is used in this paper to describe social capital that is approximated by a network ag-
gregate measure such as centrality (Freeman 1979) or structural constraint (Burt 1992). 
As the characteristics of the contacts and their specific roles are not known, it is diffi-
cult to say a priori whether the “reflection problem” plays an equivalent role here. But 
one must pay attention to the fact that measures such as centrality and structural con-
straint, traditionally cited as causes of success, are also a consequence of past success: 
people want to connect to the most successful people as a way of sharing their status 
(Gould 2002; Barabási/Albert 2002). Moreover, those already in a network of success-
ful people may hear about promising people by word of mouth before they achieve 
public success (Menger 2002), so promising or successful people are more likely to have 
a larger personal network and to appear more central. This is why indegree centrality 
is viewed more as a measure of prestige (Freeman 1979) than as a capacity to manage 
social capital in order to obtain new resources (although this can happen afterwards). 
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Regressing success on network centrality or on structural constraint can lead to suspi-
cions of reverse causality because network aggregate measures can be viewed as either 
an indicator of past success or an anticipation of future success. 
Mouw suggests several ways to overcome the difficulty of using traditional econometric 
methods to properly identify the causal impact of social capital. These include fixed ef-
fects (Mouw 2003; Yakubovich 2005), which can control for the time constant individu-
al heterogeneity, and exogenous instrumental variables, provided that such variables are 
really exogenous. He also strongly advocates for natural experiments (or randomized 
experiments, if possible) in which a random dispatch allows one to compare, as in the 
classic double-blind experiment of pharmacology, the difference in outcome for two 
randomly drawn groups: those receiving the treatment and those receiving a placebo.
For instance, several papers have used college roommate matches as a natural experi-
ment to estimate social capital effects (Zimmerman 2003; Marmarosa/Sacerdote 2002; 
Sacerdote 2001). The randomness of the matches allowed researchers to compare the 
fate of students whose roommates were among the top 25 percent of their class (treat-
ment) to the control group, whose roommates were more ordinary and fell into the 
two middle quartiles (Sacerdote 2001). The former group had an undergraduate grade 
point average 0.047 higher (0.026 standard deviation) than the latter. If roommate as-
signments were really made at random, this means that the effect was independent of 
any other observed or unobserved variable and that the estimation avoided the classic 
unobserved heterogeneity bias. 
Based on the rare cases where such methods are possible, usually involving roommate as-
signments on American college campuses (Marmarosa/Sacerdote 2002; Sacerdote 2001), 
Mouw (2006: 99) finds that the effect relationship is generally low or zero and concludes 
his article with the following pessimistic statement:
If individuals choose friends who are similar to them, then one may reasonably suspect that the 
effects of many social capital variables are overestimated because of unobserved, individual-
level factors that are correlated with friendship choice and the outcome variable of interest. This 
is not an argument that social capital does not matter, but merely a suspicion that many existing 
empirical estimates of the effect of social capital are not much of an improvement over our in-
tuition or anecdotal conviction that it does matter. Overall, the evidence reviewed here suggests 
that when the problem of endogenous friendship choice is taken into account by a method that 
attempts to deal with it explicitly, the resulting estimates of social capital effects are modest in 
size, ranging from essentially zero for the majority of the estimates using randomly assigned 
roommates to the small, but significant, coefficients reported in fixed effects models of peer ef-
fects in education or juvenile delinquency. 
This conclusion could seem rather severe for the numerous studies that use network 
variables as exogenous variables. Is the strong net correlation they find due to some 
endogeneity? Before we accept this conclusion that is so damaging to network sociology, 
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we should recall that the college roommate tie may not be the most appropriate for 
studying the impact of a network. First, this type of tie is rather heterogeneous, ranging 
from very close to distant and even conflicting. Second, a roommate has little connec-
tion at best to the professional and work environment, the domain of interest in most 
of the research on the impact of social capital. 
2 The role of mentorship in academic careers
The role of contacts and networks is not as welcome in academic labor markets as in 
other labor markets. Robert Merton (1973) has shown that the scholarly community 
developed faith in a set of norms that govern or at least should ideally govern the aca-
demic world: communalism, disinterestedness, originality, organized skepticism, and 
universalism. The last of these assumes that scientific claims will not “depend on the 
personal or social attributes of their protagonists” (ibd.: 270) and “finds further expres-
sion in the demand that careers be open to talents” (ibd.: 273). Although some studies 
stress that contacts do have a globally positive role in the development of ideas (Collins 
1998; Wuchty/Jones/Uzzi 2007), most of them question the extent to which univer-
salism and particularism govern real academic labor markets (Long/Fox 1995) while 
studying how personal relations correlate with individual outcomes such as grants, 
publications, wages, and jobs.1
One common finding of quantitative studies on academic careers is that productiv-
ity, generally measured by the number of publications, is at best a very partial predic-
tor of academic careers (Hargens/Hagstrom 1967; Long/Allison/McGinnis 1979; Long/
McGinnis 1981; Leahy 2007). The commencement and advancement of an academic 
career seems to correlate more with the productivity and prestige of the mentor and 
that of the doctoral department than with indicators of individual scientific produc-
tivity (Long/Allison/McGinnis 1979; Reskin 1979; Long/McGinnis 1981). Most studies 
insist on the overwhelming importance of a sponsor or a mentor, who is most gener-
ally the PhD advisor (Reskin 1979; Cameron/Blackburn 1981; Long/McGinnis 1985). 
Future productivity is therefore more a consequence of contextual effects than of initial 
talent (Long/McGinnis 1981). 
Studies on academic careers in United States generally focus on long-term outcomes, 
such as career advancement or wages among a set of scholars who have generally suc-
ceeded in getting at least their first job in the academic system after the PhD. Analyzing 
the European state competitive exams taken upon entrance to an academic career can 
1 See: Long/Allison/McGinnis 1979; Reskin 1979; Cameron/Blackburn 1981; Long/McGinnis 
1985; Godechot/Mariot 2004; Leahy 2007; Kirchmeyer 2005; Combes/Linnemer/Visser 2008; 
Zinovyeva/Bagues 2012; Lutter/Schröder 2014.
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help to enrich previous studies by focusing on two elements that are often overlooked: 
the possibility of comparing PhDs who succeed to those who fail, and the opportunity 
to delve more deeply into the social capital mechanisms (direct support or indirect 
prestige) by which a sponsor may help a PhD to get a job. In the French political sci-
ences field, PhDs benefit from the social capital of their advisor and that of their PhD 
committee. The number of contacts and the importance of the structural holes of the 
members of a PhD committee within the network of PhD committees are a predictor 
of the probability that PhDs will enter an academic career, a result interpreted by the 
authors as an indicator of greater efficiency in the diffusion of a reputation within a 
community (Godechot/Mariot 2004). It is likely, however, that sponsorship becomes ef-
fective not only through indirect efforts at promoting the candidate, but also when the 
applicant has a sponsor on the hiring committee itself. In their study of the Agrégation 
du supérieur, Combes (2008) find that the presence of the PhD advisor on the hiring 
committee has a strong impact, equivalent to five additional articles, and the presence 
of colleagues from the applicant’s own department has a moderate impact, but they 
find no significant impact if other faculties from the applicant’s doctoral university are 
on the committee or the PhD advisor’s coauthors are members. Zinovyeva and Bagues 
find very similar results in their study of the first step in academic recruitment of uni-
versity professors (catedrático de universidad) and associate professors (profesor titular 
de universidad) for all disciplines in Spain from 2002 to 2006: the strongest effect, tri-
pling the odds of recruitment, comes from the presence of the PhD advisor, followed by 
that of a coauthor, a colleague from the same university, or another member of the PhD 
committee (Zinovyeva/Bagues 2012: Table A1). 
Although scholars acquainted with an applicant may sometimes adopt rules to limit 
the influence of personal bias, for example remaining silent (Lamont 2010), they still 
usually participate in the final vote. Even when they may want to remain silent, their 
opinions are usually solicited by their colleagues on the committee, since an applicant’s 
contact is likely to have the most information on that applicant. Abstaining or resigning 
from the committee when one knows an applicant (a situation very common in aca-
demic “small worlds”) can often paralyze a committee. In the CNRS recruitment exam 
in France, for example, only in a limited number of cases are the members of the hiring 
committee requested to resign, such as when an applicant is a current or former family 
member, the object of a strong love or hate relationship, a supervisor, or someone with 
whom the committee member has a notorious conflict. It is not unusual for a previous 
advisee to be among the applicants, and this is all the more common in institutions 
where inbred applicants are allowed to compete. The bias in favor of former advised 
PhD candidates, as has been documented in previous literature, might in fact explain 
the levels of academic inbreeding shown for many countries and their consequences for 
academic productivity. 
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Academic inbreeding was very common in the United States until the late 1970s, gen-
erating controversy about its possible negative impact (Eells/Cleveland 1935a, 1935b; 
Hargens/Farr 1973), and it remains common in law schools (Eisenberg/Wells 2000). 
Hargens (1969) found a rate of inbred scholars in the United States of 15 percent at 
the end of the fifties, a number that is comparable to the 1 percent that would have 
prevailed had recruitment been independent from the university of origin. While most 
departments in the United States have now set informal rules banning the recruitment 
of inbred scholars, at least at the beginning of the academic career, academic inbreeding 
remains substantial in many countries in Europe and in Mexico (Horta 2013; Horta/
Veloso/Grediaga 2010; Zinovyeva/Bagues 2012). 
Godechot and Louvet (2010) have shown that in France in the 1980s, inbred PhDs 
could have seventeen times more chance of getting hired than outbred PhDs. Moreover, 
most such studies have shown, usually through a university of origin fixed effect, that 
inbred scholars are less productive scientifically (Horta 2013; Horta/Veloso/Grediaga 
2010; Eisenberg/Wells 2000; Eells/Cleveland 1935a). The classic model of sponsorship 
by an advisor could therefore have important consequences for patterns of recruitment 
in the academic labor market because it would contribute to the academic inbreeding 
phenomenon. Based on advisor mobility, Godechot and Louvet (2010b) seem to indi-
cate that advisor presence on hiring committees could be responsible for one-fourth to 
one-third of the academic inbreeding phenomenon.
Most of these studies indicate that on academic labor markets, contacts count, and 
the advisor-advisee contact counts tremendously. Nevertheless, one must not forget 
Mouw’s critique that the role of social capital can be overestimated because of statisti-
cal methods that do not handle reverse causality or unobserved heterogeneity properly. 
The fact that early career success is more related to the doctoral department or advisor’s 
productivity or prestige than the applicant’s, for instance, could also be explained by an 
improper measure of academic talent. An interesting concept like visibility (Leahy 2007) 
has been coined as a form of social capital, but it is difficult to identify properly and to 
distinguish from quality since it is measured through citation count. As we have seen 
with Combes, Linnemer and Visser (2008), most studies on the role of contacts rest 
on classical regressions and do not fully address the endogeneity issue. Godechot and 
Mariot (2004) deal with this problem by using the usual PhD committee set up by a 
PhD advisor, as an instrument for the PhD committee set up for the observed candidate. 
This strategy may account for some of the possible endogeneity measurement problems, 
but presumably not all. Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012) developed a very similar estima-
tion at the same time the present paper was being written, based on a similar natural ex-
periment in Spain: from 2002 to 2006, in all disciplines, the first step of the recruitment 
of university professors and associate professors was to be evaluated by a jury drawn at 
random from the members of a given discipline. Strikingly similar results were found 
for the French EHESS between 1961 and 2005. This similarity led us to believe that the 
phenomenon is general and extends beyond the institutional framework studied.
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3 Recruitment at EHESS: Electoral procedure, methods, and data
What would become the EHESS was founded in 1948 as the sixth “section” of the École 
Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE), a French doctoral school in social sciences. Its chief 
boosters were Charles Morazé, Lucien Febvre, and Fernand Braudel, historians of the 
“annals” school, which advocated strongly for interdisciplinary research (Mazon 1988). 
Initial faculty at the school came from four main disciplines: history, sociology, anthro-
pology, and economics. The school continued to focus on these four disciplines in sub-
sequent years, as well as expanding into other social science disciplines such as literature, 
linguistics, geography, psychology, philosophy, law, and area studies. In 1975, the sixth 
section became independent from the EPHE and Paris University and was renamed the 
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)2. This institution rapidly became 
one of the most famous institutions in the French social sciences, hiring scholars such 
as Braudel, Legoff, and Furet in history; Bourdieu, Touraine, and Boltanski in sociology; 
Lévi-Strauss, Héritier, and Descola in anthropology; Barthes and Genette in literature; 
and Guesnerie, Bourguignon, and Piketty in economics. EHESS hired also scholars who 
were much less famous than these names and much less productive in terms of publica-
tion, some of whom actively supervised numerous PhDs.
A form of recruitment both specific and general
EHESS promoted new forms of teaching (the research seminar), new ways of organiz-
ing knowledge (notably around area studies), and new forms of research that valued 
interdisciplinary exchange. It also adopted a special recruitment procedure called “elec-
tion” that continues to contribute strongly to its identity. The election procedure can 
seem specific, but it has features that are common to many other academic institutions. 
First, the procedure is interdisciplinary: apart from a few exceptions, open positions are 
described by neither discipline nor topic. Applicants are elected by the full faculty as-
sembly rather than being hired by a single-discipline jury. If they are to be successfully 
recruited, applicants must be convincing beyond their own discipline. 
Second, there are neither formal job talks nor auditions, even though applicants must 
submit a research and teaching project. Yet it is common for applicants to visit – pri-
vately, if possible – with the EHESS president, the members of the EHESS governing bu-
reau, and some key members of the faculty. If applicants are to be elected, they need fac-
ulty members who will campaign actively on their behalf to convince other electors of 
their merits. Most of this support activity is informal and difficult to collect, but traces 
2 The name EHESS will be used throughout this paper for simplicity, although this designation is 
correct only after 1975. 
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of it have been recorded in the archives. The meeting minutes provide fairly systematic 
evidence of the names of persons writing support letters in favor of applicants, or those 
who support them publicly during faculty assemblies. Recruitment is therefore similar 
to the procedures conducted by French assemblies of intellectuals such as the Académie 
française and the Académie des sciences, but it also shares interdisciplinary aspects with 
the postdoc grant application studied by Lamont (2010). Scholars are expected to be 
knowledgeable and generalist enough to evaluate applicants beyond the boundaries of 
their own respective disciplines. 
Third, because the evaluation of applicants is time-consuming and costly, since the 
early fifties the EHESS has set up an electoral commission to more thoroughly evalu-
ate applicants. The commission consists of 20 to 32 members of the EHESS faculty 
and has been assisted by an EHESS reviewer since 1975 and an external reviewer since 
1987. Until 1997, members of the EHESS that were not part of the electoral commis-
sion were allowed to step in during the meeting to say a few words in favor of one or 
another applicant. The EHESS president also has a say in which applicants are worth 
hiring and speaks on behalf of the school’s governing bureau, all of whose members 
are statutory members of the electoral commission. At the end of the discussion, the 
electoral commission will rank the applicants, usually through a one-round vote. This 
indicative ranking is very influential and is announced at the opening of the faculty as-
semblies devoted to recruitment. Applicants obtaining an absolute majority from the 
first round are put forward,3 followed by others in decreasing order of votes. Unless a 
faculty member specifically requests it, applicants who did not receive any votes in the 
electoral commission are not discussed. Applicants who received votes are presented to 
the assembly by the internal reviewer, and declared supporters speak in their favor. The 
discussion is followed by multiple rounds of voting, at the end of which the applicants 
elected are hired. 
The electoral commission therefore plays a similar role to that of the hiring committees 
at many American universities, which conduct an initial evaluation of applicants before 
a vote by the full faculty. The commission result constitutes a sort of straw poll, estab-
lishing a list of applicants worthy of concentrated support and votes during the assem-
bly. Applicants with majority support from the electoral commission have a very high 
chance of being elected by the assembly: 87 percent of those who achieved a majority at 
the first stage were ultimately elected, versus 5 percent of the rest. Still, the election as-
sembly is not just a simple confirmation of the electoral commission’s choice. One time 
out of every eight, it contradicts the electoral commission, most generally in the case of 
applicants who were put forward but did not achieve a strong majority. Only 68 percent 
3 It must be noted that the combination of one-round votes and absolute majority criteria may 
sometimes lead the electoral commission to put forward fewer applicants than the number of 
open positions.
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of the applicants with 50 to 60 percent of the votes during the electoral commission 
were ultimately elected, whereas those close to the majority at the first stage, with 40 to 
50 percent of the votes, still had a fair chance of 42 percent of ultimately being elected.
The random dimension of the electoral commission
Let us now turn to an interesting feature of the electoral commission for testing the 
causal impact of social capital: its composition. Since 1961, the EHESS has drawn most 
of the members of its two electoral commissions (one for assistant professor exams, the 
other for professor exams) at random from the faculty assembly. It is therefore possible 
to compare applicants whose contacts have been drawn to sit on the commission to 
those whose contacts have not been drawn. 
This quasi experimental setting has some complexities we must account for, however 
(Table 1). One-third of the commission consists of statutory members: the president of 
the EHESS, the four or five members of his or her bureau, and the EHESS members of 
the scientific council, who are elected for terms of four to five years. These nonrandom 
members of the commission may have some special unobserved characteristics (such as 
administrative, scientific, and/or political talent) that favored their election as president, 
bureau member, or scientific council delegate, leading to the fear that applicants in 
contact with those ex officio commission members could share their unobserved char-
acteristics and that these could explain their recruitment. We must make sure, therefore, 
that such contacts do not bias our estimation of the social capital effect. 
The second complexity is that substitutes are also drawn at random to replace titu-
lar drawn members that are not able to attend the electoral commission meeting. The 
chance any substitute has of sitting in the commission is lower than that of a titular 
(drawn) member and is not totally random, since it depends on the nonrandom deci-
sion of the titular member whether to sit out the electoral commission. 
To add a third complexity, there is a significant difference between the theoretical size 
of the electoral commission and its effective size, because of unexpected absences that 
even the use of substitutes cannot remedy completely. On the one hand, contacts who 
want to promote applicants are probably more effective if they are present at the meet-
ing, so social capital might be better measured if we analyze effective presence rather 
than composition. On the other, the decision whether to attend the meeting is not ran-
dom, and this may bias the results. In order to avoid this last bias, then, we should 
analyze commission composition, which could be viewed as the intention to treat effect, 
rather than meeting presence, which could be viewed as the treatment on treated effect.
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In a fourth complexity, although the records are of very good quality for a French aca-
demic institution overall, there are some holes (Table 2): the results of the electoral 
commission were not available for one-third of the exams. Of the remaining exams, 
composition and presence were recorded for two-thirds of the exams, presence for only 
one-fourth, and composition for only one-tenth. Sample size could be restricted to the 
exams for which the most information is available, but to do so could have a negative 
effect on the statistical power.
Table 1 Composition of electoral commissions
Assistant professors Professors
Composition Presence Composition Presence
Total size (including substitutes) 33.83
(6.05)
28.48
(3.24)
Effective size (excluding substitutes/
including present substitutes)
28.00
(4.30)
25.50
(5.38)
24.16
(3.06)
21.61
(4.26)
Bureau including president 5.43
(1.19)
4.97
(0.82)
5.13
(1.42)
4.61
(1.15)
Scientific council 6.57
(4.75)
5.56
(4.54)
3.56
(2.98)
3.02
(2.81)
Randomly drawn members  
including substitutes
22.67
(4.64)
20.09
(3.44)
Substitutes (randomly drawn/present) 5.83
(3.21)
1.56
(1.58)
4.32
(1.46)
1.58
(1.45)
Effective numbers of randomly drawn 
members (excluding substitutes/
including present substitutes)
16.83
(3.59)
14.97
(4.91)
15.77
(3.49)
13.84
(5.34)
Number of competitive exams 30 32 79 99
Note: The average electoral commission for the assistant professor exam has 33.8 members: 5.4 members of 
the bureau, 6.6 members of the scientific council, 16.8 randomly drawn titular members, and 5.8 randomly 
drawn substitutes. Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
Table 2 Reconstitution of electoral commissions
Number of  
competitive exams
Number of  
applications
Number of  
elected applicants
Electoral commission 
records
Asst. 
prof.
Prof. Total Asst. 
prof.
Prof. Total Asst. 
prof.
Prof. Total
Composition and 
presence
 
24
 
70
 
94
 
543
 
796
 
1,339
 
85
 
196
 
281
Composition only 5 7 12 56 154 310 15 32 47
Presence only 8 29 37 274 286 560 25 72 97
Subtotal 37 106 143 973 1,236 2,209 125 300 425
Composition known, 
results of EC unknown
 
15
 
35
 
50
 
336
 
325
 
661
 
85
 
98
 
183
Composition unknown 3 10 13 27 69 96 17 16 33
Total 55 151 206 1,336 1,630 2,966 227 414 641
Note: Twenty-four assistant professor exams recorded both composition and presence at the electoral com-
mission. 543 applications were recorded and 85 persons were elected.
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The experimental design is well suited to accurately estimate the effect of having ran-
domly drawn contacts in the electoral commission and to limit this to the population 
with contacts among the members of the EHESS submitted to the random draw. Not all 
applicants fall into this case; some do not have contacts or do not have contacts among 
the EHESS faculty. I must therefore control for those applications outside the experi-
mental framework in order to properly establish the social capital effect.
The model
I therefore model the probability of success (for instance winning a majority of votes 
at the electoral commission) as a function of the number of contacts among the drawn 
members of the electoral commission (drawn), the number of contacts among the ex 
officio members of the electoral commission (exofficio), the number of contacts in the 
EHESS that do not belong to the electoral commission (undrawn), and a fixed effect for 
each exam (exam
j
). 
P (success) = a. drawn + b. exofficio + c. undrawn + exam
j
 + u (1) 
The causal effect of having a contact in the electoral commission is given by (a – c): the 
difference between drawn contacts (treatment) and undrawn contacts (control). I can 
reformulate (1) in the following way, so that a’ = a – c is directly estimated : 
P (success) = a’. drawn + b’. exofficio + c. EHESS + exam
j
 + u (2) 
with EHESS = drawn + exofficio + undrawn referring to all members of the EHESS faculty.
Thus I control for applications outside the de facto experimental setting, such as 
applicants whose contacts are outside EHESS (EHESS = 0) or are nonrandom members 
of the electoral commission (exofficio). I will not interpret these variables, as I cannot 
correctly identify the underlying effect (effect of the contact or of unobserved 
heterogeneity), but I use such variables to isolate the causal effect of the random draw.
In all estimations, I add an exam fixed effect because each exam, with its specific degree 
of competition, is de facto one experiment, where “treated” and “control” applicants 
compete against one another. To estimate “experimental exams” more accurately, I will 
restrict some estimates to exams where I find both treated applicants ( ∑ (drawn) > 0) 
and control applicants ( ∑ (undrawn) > 0).
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Links studied
The following presents some details on the links I can investigate for the 2,209 applica-
tions for which I know both the members of the electoral commission and the ranking 
produced during this first step of recruitment (Table 3). I collected the PhD advisor for 
all applicants.4 Of the 419 applications that enter the experimental design, 90 percent 
are “inbred” applications of EHESS PhDs, plus a minority of 10 percent of external ap-
plicants whose advisor was hired after their PhD was defended. I also collected all PhD 
committees for defenses at the EHESS from 1960 to 2005. I can therefore measure for 
the applications of EHESS PhDs the impact of having other members of the PhD com-
mittee on the committee as titular members. Similarly, the more senior applicants may 
also have invited some EHESS colleagues to be on the PhD committee of one of their 
students or have been invited by them for the same reason. I consider this invitation re-
lation to be a link when it occurs during the three years preceding the application. I also 
study more indirect links based on common characteristics, such as the impact of the 
number of persons with whom the applicant shares the same PhD advisor or discipline.
A specific feature of the EHESS survey is that its archives contain records of public 
acts of support, either as reference letters examined during the electoral commission 
meeting or as viva voce support in the faculty assembly. Unfortunately, reference 
letters were either uncommon or irregularly recorded in the minutes of the electoral 
commission before 1980, and viva voce support was not recorded in the minutes of 
the faculty assembly at all between 1980 and 1993. Moreover, it is likely that these two 
forms of support are not completely independent from the random composition of 
the electoral commission. If complete applications are not due until after the electoral 
commission has been composed,5 decisions to write or request support letters may be 
modified by the random composition. Support for someone at the assembly that occurs 
after the result of the electoral commission may be influenced by what happened during 
the commission’s meeting. Nevertheless, for persons who repeat their application – a 
common feature, since only half of the applicants are recruited at their first trial – support 
collected during previous trials is clearly independent from the random composition of 
the electoral commission.
4 It was not rare for some persons to apply without a PhD (like Pierre Bourdieu), especially before 
1985. Fourteen percent of the applications fell into this case. For 24 percent of the applicants, I 
could not find any information on either the PhD or their advisor. 
5 Unfortunately, I do not always know the precise date the electoral commission was composed, 
and I generally do not know the date on which complete applications are due. At the end of the 
period, the composition of the electoral commission could be decided anywhere from three 
to six months in advance of the electoral commission meeting. Applications are generally due 
three months in advance of this event. But reference letters can be sent up to a few days before 
the electoral commission meeting.
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Checking the experiment’s validity
Before analyzing the results, I will address the classic question of whether experimental 
conditions can modify behaviors and bias the results of the experiment. The experi-
ment in question here is not double-blind: the members of the electoral commission 
know that the applicants they support have applied, and applicants may know that their 
contacts are members of the electoral commission. This knowledge might favor certain 
strategic decisions, such as whether to apply (if the electoral commission is constituted 
before application), whether to withdraw an application, and whether to attend the 
electoral commission meeting. I will analyze this phenomenon with specific attention 
to the link considered by previous literature as the most effective form of sponsorship: 
the PhD advisor–advisee link.6
6 Table A1 in the appendix indeed shows that the PhD advisors are very involved in supporting 
their former advisees. When advisees apply, 39 percent of advisors write reference letters, 39 
percent support them publicly in the faculty assembly, and 57 percent support them in either 
one way or the other.
Table 3 Types of links investigated
Number 
of links in 
EHESS
Number of 
links drawn 
in EC
Number of 
links undrawn 
in EC
Number of 
applications 
with links  
in EHESS
Number of 
applications  
with links  
drawn in EC
Number of 
applications  
with links 
undrawn in EC
EHESS PhD 
advisor
450 62 357 450 62 357
Other members 
of the PhD 
committee
 
554
 
62
 
430
 
417
 
61
 
344
PhD committee 
invitation link
 
317
 
45
 
236
 
198
 
44
 
159
Coauthor 893 132 667 315 87 274
Same PhD 
advisor
595 87 473 338 72 297
Same discipline 55,059 6,222 45,015 1,998 1,502 1,982
Reference 
letters for EC
 
1,603
 
133
 
1,385
 
774
 
121
 
725
Viva voce 
support in FA
 
4,340
 
704
 
3,203
 
798
 
436
 
758
Letters or viva 
voce 
5,422 806 4,127 1,165 516 1,097
Letters or viva 
voce in t –1
 
1,608
 
171
 
1,273
 
413
 
134
 
378
Note: 1,603 reference letters were written for applicants: 133 from drawn members of the Electoral Commis-
sion (EC), 1,385 from EHESS faculty undrawn in the electoral commission (EC). There were 774 applications 
with at least one letter from a member of the faculty, 121 with at least one from EHESS faculty drawn in the 
electoral commission, and 725 with at least one from EHESS faculty undrawn in the electoral commission.
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Studying the question of whether the random draw modifies applicants’ behavior is dif-
ficult, because this requires a larger population of potential applicants. I therefore use the 
larger population of EHESS PhDs and analyze the probability that candidates with PhDs 
from the EHESS will apply for the assistant professor exam in each of the fifteen years 
that follow the PhD defense. Table A2 shows that having one’s advisor randomly drawn 
for the electoral commission does not substantially change the results. Having contacts 
within the EHESS clearly counts in whether one applies or not, but the specific fact of 
having an advisor on or off the electoral commission does not seem to have any impact. 
It is easier to determine whether the knowledge of applications influences the probability 
that an advisor will attend the electoral commission meeting. Table A3 provides such 
an analysis, and we can see that the experimental conditions are not totally met. The 
probability that an advisor will attend the electoral commission meeting increases 
significantly when a former advisee applies. This leads me to privilege the composition 
of the electoral commission (the intention to treat effect) rather than effective presence 
(the treatment on treated effect) here as well.
However, table A4 shows that the random draw of the electoral commission is inde-
pendent from the characteristics of the applicants and that the main predictors of suc-
cess at the electoral commission stage (native-born French national, prestigious higher 
degrees such as the École Normale Supérieure or Agrégation, prior publications, and 
number of previous applications) have no effect on the probability of whether an ap-
plicant’s PhD advisor will be on the committee. This result shows that the random draw 
is not biased and that I can causally interpret the result without fearing some bias due 
to unobserved heterogeneity or reverse causality.7 
4 Results
The advisor effect on the electoral commission
The descriptive statistics in table A5 deliver the message of this experiment almost 
completely. The rate of success at the first step for applicants whose advisors are 
randomly drawn for the electoral commission is 34 percent, with an average proportion 
of votes of 28 percent, while that of the control group with undrawn advisors is 20 
percent, with an average proportion of votes of 22 percent. In table 4 (model 2), I added 
exam fixed effects in order to take into account the fact that each exam is actually one 
experiment. “Contact” is defined here as an applicant’s PhD advisor being randomly 
drawn as either a titular or substitute member of the electoral commission. When the 
7 There is therefore no need to introduce control variables in the following regressions.
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composition of the commission is not known (one-fourth of the cases), I use presence 
at the electoral commission meeting. This represents a compromise between the purity 
of the randomized experience and statistical power. Furthermore, I will show that the 
results still hold even if I restrict more precisely to the random conditions. I privilege 
linear probability models in order to estimate dichotomous variables such as being put 
forward by the electoral commission, but I also test with logistic regression (Table A6) 
and the results are very close.8 
The selection of the PhD advisor to the electoral commission increases a former advisee’s 
probability of being put forward by 13 percentage points and increases the vote share 
by 5 percentage points (not significant). The contrast between these two results may 
be due to the fact that a PhD advisor will mainly campaign in favor of former advisees 
when the latter are near the majority threshold. 
I then restrict further (model 4 of Table 4), to “experimental exams” where applicants 
with drawn contacts and those with undrawn contacts compete.9 The advantage of 
having a contact inside the jury in this case increases the probability of being put 
forward to 19 percentage points and the share of votes to 9 percentage points. Part 
of this result could be biased, however, as I also use exams where I only have presence 
(treatment on treated) instead of composition (intention to treat). Model 4 shows that 
the drawn advisor effect remains, and its magnitude even increases when restricted 
only to exams for which I have the composition. Finally, I estimate the advisor effect 
within two subpopulations, assistant professors (Maîtres assistants and Maîtres de 
conférences) and full or joint professor exams (Directeurs d’études and Directeurs 
d’études cumulants). The advisor effect is much stronger and more significant for 
assistant professors (+22 percentage points in probability of being put forward, +11 
percentage points in share of votes) than for professors (+14 points in probability and 
+6 percent share of votes), where it is lower and not significant (although not very far 
from the 10 percent threshold). Two reasons could explain this difference, and both 
are very similar to those found by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012). First, the link to the 
former PhD advisor may weaken as time passes after completion of the PhD. Second, it 
might be easier at professor exams to evaluate applicants on the basis of their scientific 
records and their personal reputation, and voters might rely less on the comments of 
those who know the applicant best.
8 There has been recent debate on the respective merits of logistic regression and linear probabil-
ity models (Moud 2010; Angrist/Pischke 2009). Logistic regression provides a better functional 
form, especially near the 0 or 1 borders, but its constant variance may call into question the 
comparison of parameters from one regression to another. 
9 Some kind of academic inbreeding has inflated the parameter for undrawn EHESS contacts in 
exams where no candidates have had contacts drawn, therefore shrinking the final difference 
with candidates whose contacts were drawn.
Godechot: The Chance of Influence 17
Table 4 Applications put forward by electoral commission and vote share in the electoral 
commission
A Applications put forward (linear probability models)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Applications whose PhD advisor is
Randomly 
drawn member 
of the EC
0.137**
(0.062)
0.129*
(0.066)
0.187***
(0.068)
0.220**
(0.085)
0.215**
(0.091)
0.139
(0.104)
Ex officio  
member  
of the EC
0.056
(0.076)
0.019
(0.072)
0.050
(0.081)
–0.002
(0.107)
0.029
(0.089)
0.137
(0.189)
Member of the 
EHESS
0.040
(0.029)
0.051*
(0.027)
0.021
(0.030)
0.014
(0.035)
0.015
(0.036)
0.035
(0.055)
Competitive 
exam fixed ef-
fects
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
Field All com-
petitive 
exams
All com-
petitive 
exams
All experi-
mental  
exams
All ex-
perimental 
exams with 
composition
Assistant pro-
fessor experi-
mental exams
Professor 
experimen-
tal exams
Number of  
applications 
[n1; n2]
 
2,209
[357; 62]
 
2,209
[357; 62]
 
991
[184; 55]
 
749
[143; 42]
 
563
[131; 33]
 
428
[53; 22]
B Vote share
1 2 3 4 5 6
Applicants whose PhD advisor is
Randomly 
drawn member 
of the EC
0.059 
(0.039)
0.053
(0.039)
0.090**
(0.040)
0.098*
(0.050)
0.113*
(0.057)
0.064
(0.051)
Ex officio 
member  
of the EC
0.088
(0.054)
0.050
(0.049)
0.077
(0.060)
0.094
(0.085)
0.017
(0.060)
0.293**
(0.108)
Member of the 
EHESS
0.046**
(0.019)
0.053***
(0.016)
0.036*
(0.020)
0.041*
(0.023)
0.043*
(0.024)
0.022
(0.037)
Competitive 
exam fixed 
effects
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
Field All com-
petitive 
exams
All com-
petitive 
exams
All experi-
mental  
exams
All ex-
perimental 
exams with 
composition
Assistant pro-
fessor experi-
mental exams
Professor 
experimen-
tal exams
Number of 
applications 
[n1; n2]
 
2,194
[357; 62]
 
2,194
[357; 62]
 
991
[184; 55]
 
749
[143; 42]
 
563
[131; 33]
 
428
[53; 22]
Note: OLS estimates. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. n1 represents the number 
of applicants whose advisor was eligible but not drawn for the electoral commission, n2 represents the 
number of applicants whose advisor was drawn for the electoral commission. Experimental exams refer 
to exams where I find both applicants with undrawn contacts (n1 > 0) and applicants with drawn contacts 
(n2 > 0).
***: p < 0.01;  **: p < 0.05;  *: p < 0.1.
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In order to more thoroughly evaluate the advisor effect and the difference between the 
intention to treat effect and the treatment on treated effect, I restrict the sample to experi-
mental exams (as previously defined) for which I know both presence and composition 
(Table 5). The advisor effect is somehow higher when I consider titular members initially 
drawn for the committee (+25 percentage points in probability of being put forward, +13 
percentage points in share of votes) or advisors who are ultimately present on the elec-
toral commission. This last treatment on treated effect may be biased for the reasons ex-
plained above, but we may nevertheless be able to measure the treatment on treated effect 
by opting for instrumental variables. In the first-stage regression, I model the probability 
that an applicant’s PhD advisor who has been drawn for the commission will ultimately 
be present on the commission, based on the type of drawing (titular or substitute). In the 
second-stage regression, instead of using biased presence, I use the prediction of pres-
ence based on clearly random exogenous instruments. The treatment on treated effect 
is even higher, with +29 percentage points in probability of being put forward and +15 
percentage points in share of votes. This estimation could be an unbiased estimation of 
the treatment on treated effect of the PhD advisor, provided that advisors influence their 
colleagues only during the final meeting of the electoral commission.10
10 The campaign aspect of the recruitment makes this last hypothesis questionable. Members of 
the electoral commission who cannot make it to the commission meeting may try to influence 
their colleagues in advance.
Table 5 Variations of results depending on the definition of the membership of the electoral 
commission
1
Proposed
2
Share  
of votes
3
Proposed
4
Share  
of votes
5
Proposed
6
Share  
of votes
7
Proposed
8
Share  
of votes
Applications whose PhD advisor is 
Randomly drawn 
member of the EC
0.219**
(0.099)
0.114*
(0.059)
0.250**
(0.105)
0.130*
(0.063)
0.251**
(0.117)
0.134*
(0.065)
0.286** 
(0.122)
0.148*
(0.074)
Ex officio members  
of the EC
–0.103**
(0.044)
0.094
(0.110)
–0.100**
(0.043)
0.095
(0.110)
–0.109**
(0.041)
0.092
(0.108)
–0.099**
(0.044)
0.096
(0.110)
Member of the 
EHESS
0.004
(0.044)
0.037
(0.033)
0.002
(0.043)
0.036
(0.032)
0.009
(0.043)
0.039
(0.030)
0.001
(0.044)
0.035
(0.033)
Definition of 
membership to  
electoral commission
Drawn as titular  
or subsidy
Drawn as titular Presence Presence predicted 
with instrumental 
variables
Number of 
applications [n1; n2]
495
[87; 37]
495
[91; 34]
495
[94; 30]
495
[94; 30]
Note: OLS estimates. In parentheses, robust clustered (by exams) standard errors. n1 represents the num-
ber of applicants whose advisor was eligible but not drawn in the electoral commission, n2 represents the 
number of applicants whose advisor was drawn in the electoral commissions. Field: experimental exams for 
which I know composition and presence with both treated (n2 > 0) and control applications (n1 > 0).
***: p < 0.01;  **: p < 0.05;  *: p < 0.1.
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The advisor effect at various stages
How does the selection of the PhD advisor to the electoral commission influence the 
recruitment process overall? In Table 6, I estimate the different steps of the recruitment 
process based on model 4 of Table 4, this paper’s favorite estimation combining experi-
mental accuracy and statistical power. First, randomly drawn PhD advisors seem to 
have no influence on the president’s support (in the name of the bureau) during the 
electoral commission meeting. Instead, a PhD advisor probably influences other 
colleagues: they get an average of 9 percent of the electoral commission (equivalent to 
themselves and one other person) to vote in favor of their former PhD candidates. This 
could seem like a rather limited influence, but we must recall that members of the 
electoral commission do not always support their former PhD advisees; for some 
recruitment years, they might influence up to two or three other people, a number that 
can be decisive, especially when the application is near the majority threshold.
The impact of the random composition of the electoral commission continues during 
the faculty assembly, the final and decisive step of the recruitment process. The selec-
tion of the PhD advisor in the electoral commission increases by 0.6 the number of 
persons speaking in favor of the applicant (nearly significant), adds 6 percentage points 
Table 6 The advisor effect on different steps of recruitment
Explained variable PhD advisor randomly 
drawn effect
N
[n1; n2]
1. President’s support in electoral commission –0.018
(0.074)
711
[131; 47]
2. Share of votes in electoral commission 0.091**
(0.040)
991
[184; 55]
3. Number of votes in electoral commission 2.060**
(0.938)
991
[184; 55]
4. Put forward in electoral commission 0.187***
(0.068)
991
[184; 55]
5. Number of viva voce supports in faculty assembly 0.650
(0.421)
991
[184; 55]
6. Vote share in faculty assembly 0.062
(0.041)
981
[181; 53]
7. Number of votes in faculty assembly 3.908
(3.836)
981
[181; 53]
8. Election in faculty assembly 0.132**
(0.060)
991
[184; 55]
Note: Each cell corresponds to a different regression (OLS estimates). The regressions are similar to 
those used in table 4. I show only the parameter of interest. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) 
in parentheses. n1 represents the number of applicants with an eligible advisor who was not drawn 
for the electoral commission; n2, the number of applicants whose advisor was drawn for the electoral 
commission. Field: experimental exams with both treated (n2 > 0) and control applications (n1 > 0).
***: p < 0.01;  **: p < 0.05;  *: p < 0.1.
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to the share of votes (nearly significant), and 13 percentage points to the probability of 
being elected (significant). These effects are essentially due to the better rank achieved 
during the first step because of the random selection of the PhD advisor to the electoral 
commission.
Effects of other contacts
PhD advisors – the usual suspects in academic sponsoring – have a clear effect on 
academic recruitment that cannot be due to some form of unobserved assortative 
matching between themselves and their former advisees. But are they the only contacts 
who influence the recruitment process? In table 7, I analyze the sponsoring effects of 
other possible contacts, whom I compare to the PhD advisor. 
Coauthors, sometimes considered a rather strong collaboration tie (Zinovyeva/Bagues 
2010; Combes/Linnemer/Visser 2008), come in second in terms of magnitude. But 
there is a lack of statistical power here, and the effect is not significant. This might be 
explained by the fact that within French social science during the period, coauthor-
ing remained rare and socially heterogeneous (with an important fraction of coedited 
books, which involve less collaboration, among the coauthored publications).
Weaker links, such as other members of PhD committees or members of the same disci-
pline, do not seem to influence the recruitment process. This negative result also tends 
to show that advisors’ involvement is not just a question of thematic or disciplinary 
similarity with their former advisee. Similarly, PhD committee invitation links for pro-
fessor exams do not have any measured impact. But if I restrict to external applications, 
they then have a significant positive impact on the share of votes. At the professor level, 
one-third of the applications and 44 percent of the applicants put forward are already 
assistant professors at EHESS. For those applicants who are well integrated into the 
EHESS institution, multiple channels of influence may exist (such as team and research 
center memberships). For more external applications, however, PhD links are a way of 
influencing and entering this institution.
A contact is generally expected to have a positive influence. Surprisingly, I also found a 
type of contact for which this is not the case: when a contact had the same PhD advisor 
as the applicant. In professor exams, the random selection of this type of contact low-
ers the probability of being put forward by 16 percentage points and the share of votes 
collected by 9 percentage points. Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012), on the other hand, do 
not find any impact at all for this type of contact. This unexpected result is likely to be 
specific to EHESS history and its recruitment procedures; EHESS was a central place 
for the reconstruction of the social sciences in France during the second half of the 
twentieth century. It was the locus for many burgeoning and often antagonistic schools 
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of thought, with opposing scholars coming from the same intellectual background who 
often had the same advisors, in a fractal way (Abbott 2001). This negative effect may 
therefore be due to the fact that, as PhD solidarity declines with time, EHESS members 
may want to be their advisor’s only intellectual descendant and may be reluctant to hire 
other rival descendants.
I also focus on the efficiency of declared acts of support, written letters of reference, or 
the public viva voce support of applicants during the faculty assembly. As stated above, 
the electoral commission membership is put together before viva voce support at the 
faculty assembly can be given, and letters may be written before or afterward, meaning 
that both of these could plausibly be influenced by the composition of the committee.11 
While I cannot claim to identify the causal effect properly, the results are nevertheless 
suggestive. A letter supporter only has a significant effect on professor exams. A viva 
voce supporter helps on all types of exams, and increases the share of votes at assistant 
professor exams. Either form of support significantly increases the probability of an 
applicant being put forward (all exams and professor exams) and the share of votes 
(all exams assistant professor and professor exams). Because the decision to support 
is biased by the composition of the commission, I also consider the case when past 
supporters of applicants who repeat their application after a failure are drawn for the 
commission, and hence those supporters not influenced by the random composition of 
the electoral commission.12 Past supporters have a clear positive and significant causal 
effect both on the committee proposal (ranging from 9 percentage points for all exams 
to 16 for assistant exams) and on its share of votes (ranging from 5 percentage points 
for all exams to 9 for assistant professor exams). This effect remains significant even 
when I control for the selection of the advisor to the electoral commission. Although 
advisors are very likely to actively support their applicants through letters or public 
declarations in the faculty assembly (57 percent of them do so; Table A1), the supporter 
effect is not just an advisor effect. 
5 Concluding comments
As Weber has pointed out, entering into academia and prog ressing further in an 
academic career is “a matter of pure chance” – the chance of having a supporter on 
a recruitment committee (Dreijmanis/Wells 2008). I identified former PhD advisors 
11 In fact, when I regress the probability for an EHESS scholar to support a given applicant upon 
being selected for the electoral commission, I find that commission membership significantly 
decreases the probability of writing a reference letter but significantly increases the probability 
of publicly supporting an applicant during the faculty assembly. 
12 I successfully verified that there was no significant correlation between these acts of support and 
being randomly selected for the electoral commission. 
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as among the strongest potential sponsors, with an effect that can double or triple a 
candidate’s odds of being put forward. This effect is very similar to the one found by 
Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012) in their study of a similar natural experiment in a different 
institutional setting: a seven-member disciplinary and national recruitment committee 
in Spain between 2002 and 2006.13 The striking convergence between the two studies 
shows that the results can be extrapolated beyond these two cases. Moreover, the results 
found in these quasi experimental conditions are also strikingly in line with previous 
nonexperimental studies for which one could also raise concerns about possible 
unobserved heterogeneity or reverse causality. Contrary to Mouw (2006), then, it would 
appear that such biases would not threaten the validity of the results in this paper either.
Possible underlying mechanisms
Although some applicants’ ties, such as those to a former PhD advisor, have a purely 
causal effect on the recruitment committee’s decision, the reasons underlying such 
involvement are still not clear. Several mechanisms may contribute to it. First, advisors 
and advisees share similar scientific preferences, which are at the basis of their PhD 
collaboration. Perhaps it is less about advisors supporting persons they know than about 
supporting scientific approaches they like. A second mechanism in terms of information 
and evaluation costs could lead to similar results, in a somewhat Granovetterian 
spirit (Yakubovich 2005; Granovetter 1973): advisors are already well aware of what 
is interesting about their advisees’ work, and it is less costly to find and promote the 
key points of these applicants than those of the applicants an advisor does not know. 
However, the fact that other members of the PhD committee do not have any effect, 
even when they may share similar scientific preferences and also be well acquainted with 
applicants’ work, would suggest that these two first mechanisms are not that important.14 
One could also suspect that the strong personal links to former advisees generate either 
subconscious or conscious judgment biases. In the first case, because advisors know 
and like their former advisees, they will subconsciously end up valuing their advisees’ 
scientific contribution. The second case could be seen as an example of the classical 
“motivation” argument (Obukhova 2012; Granovetter 1973): advisors deliberately 
13 They find an advisor effect of 14 percentage points for all exams (18 for assistant professor 
exams and 10 for professor exams) (Zinovyeva/Bagues 2012: Table A1). Let us turn their re-
sults into an odds ratio for better comparability: in Spain, advisors’ selection to the committee 
multiplies the probability of success by 2.6 (3 for assistants, 2.1 for professors). For EHESS, I 
find an odds ratio of 2 (2.2 for assistants, 1.8 for professors) and 2.9 (3.5 for assistants, 2.3 for 
professors) when I restrict to experimental exams (cf. logs given in table A6).
14 It is true that members of the PhD committee (chosen in France at the end of the PhD) may 
have fewer shared scientific preferences with the applicants and less knowledge of their scien-
tific contributions than PhD advisors.
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support applicants they like, even though they may feel that their advisees are not the 
best candidates. New research is needed in order to disentangle the respective power of 
these four mechanisms. 
A public policy issue
As noted previously, the impact of the advisor may contribute to the importance of 
academic inbreeding, a feature common in many countries and strongly debated. At 
EHESS, the random selection of applicants’ advisors to the electoral commission causes 
ten more advisees to be put forward than otherwise would have and contributes to one-
third of the success differential between inbred (22 percent) and external applicants 
(16 percent). The probability for inbred applicants to have their advisor on the 
EHESS recruitment committee is low (1 out of 8), whereas in university departments, 
especially small ones, it is probably much higher and thus contributes much more to 
academic inbreeding. The results could also have normative consequences for public 
policy. Academic systems share (or are supposed to share) the Mertonian ideal of 
meritocracy and indifference to personal characteristics. Systematic bias in recruitment 
is prejudicial both to the quality of the academic system and to its equity. On the other 
hand, academia consists of small communities where people know one another well. 
Excluding all persons with a potential bias toward an applicant could lead to paralysis. 
Academic institutions must arbitrage these two risks. One possible way of coping with 
an important fraction of possible bias without paralyzing recruitment would be to ban 
the recruitment of inbred candidates, a practice of most American universities since the 
1980s (and most mathematics departments in France since the early 2000s).
On the respective efficiency of strong and weak ties
Finally, this natural experiment furthers the debate on the efficiency of social capital and 
contacts in getting a job, as well as the respective roles played by strong and weak ties. 
I show that social capital clearly does matter, in contrast to Mouw’s (2006) statement. 
Social capital counts in getting a job when at least one contact is in a position to have a 
significant influence on the recruitment decision as either a recruiter, counselor of the 
recruiter, or member of a recruiting committee. In such cases, a given stronger tie (e.g., 
the PhD advisor) is much more effective than a given weaker tie (e.g., other members 
of the PhD committee), presumably because of the greater “motivation” of stronger ties 
(Obukhova 2012; Granovetter 1973). 
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Before inverting the Granovetterian formula (Krackhardt 1992), however, we must add 
some nuances. First, the motivation mechanism does not invalidate the information 
mechanism and may very well coexist with the latter along different channels. Second, 
the aggregate effect of weak ties must not be downplayed, even where motivation is con-
cerned. Recalling that the probability for a given tie to have an effective role in a recruit-
ment committee is low, and that people have more weak ties than strong ties, we must 
balance (in terms of mathematical expectation) the strong influence of a lower number 
of strong ties against the small influence of a much higher number of weak ties.15
15 Limited statistical power prevented me from identifying a significant weak-tie effect in my data 
(aside from the letters of viva voce supporters, which are more difficult to interpret in terms of 
tie strength). But relying on Zinovyeva and Bagues (2012), I can make the following compari-
son: the advisor effect (+14 percentage points) is 4.5 times that of another member of the PhD 
committee. Since PhD committees have an average of four non-advisor members, the expected 
influence of the other members could reach that of the advisor.
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Appendix
Table A1 Types of contacts and supports
Reference  
letters
Public support in  
faculty assembly
Either form  
of support
Percentage Links Percentage Links Percentage Links
EHESS PhD advisor 39 404 39 392 57 235
Other members of the  
PhD committee
 
16
 
513
 
23
 
478
 
31
 
337
PhD committee invitation link 16 313 31 225 41 157
Coauthor 11 1,043 23 604 28 468
Same PhD advisor link 8.3 625 16 472 24 342
Same discipline 1.6 55,237 4.3 48,641 5.1 35,973
Reference letters (100) 1,761 52 1,002 (100) 1,002
Viva voce support in assembly 14 3,771 (100) 4,968 (100) 3,771
Letters or viva voce 35 5,010 91 5,448 (100) 4,251
Letters or viva voce in t-1 27 1,646 39 1,610 49 1,348
All faculty members 0.46 383,467 1.44 344,594 1.78 239,147
Table A2 Probability for EHESS PhDs to apply depending on the advisor’s membership 
in the electoral commission
Variables 1
(Logit)
2
(OLS)
Number of years since PhD 0.156**
(0.073)
0.00070
(0.00060)
Squared number of years since PhD –0.022***
(0.006)
–0.00010**
(0.00004)
Advisor drawn member of the EC 0.184
(0.183)
0.00300
(0.00300)
Advisor Ex officio member of the EC –0.012
(0.227)
–0.00008
(0.00200)
Advisor member of the EHESS 0.403***
(0.101)
0.00400**
(0.00090)
Competitive exam fixed effects Yes Yes
Field Assistant professor exams Assistant professor exams
Number of potential applications 41,530 41,530
Note: The probability of applying to an assistant professor competitive exam is modeled with logis-
tic regression (1) and OLS (2). Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. 
***: p < 0.01;  **: p < 0.05;  *: p < 0.1.
Field: we selected the population of EHESS PhDs who completed their PhD during the fifteen years 
preceding the EHESS exam (we excluded those who were already hired at the EHESS).
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Table A3 Probability of attending the electoral commission meeting
Variables 1
(Logit)
2
(OLS)
Drawn substitute member –1.405***
(0.146)
–0.306***
(0.031)
Ex officio member 1.060***
(0.154)
0.146***
(0.021)
With at least one PhD advisee 
applying
0.918**
(0.404)
0.133***
(0.048)
Drawn substitute member with at 
least one PhD advisee applying
0.386
(0.884)
0.053
(0.207)
Ex officio member with at least one 
PhD advisee applying
1.172**
(0.459)
0.093***
(0.023)
Competitive exam fixed effects Yes Yes
Field All competitive exams with 
composition and presence
All competitive exams with 
composition and presence
N 2,820 2,820
Note: The probability of attending the electoral commission is modeled both through a logistic 
regression (column 1) and an OLS model. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. 
The reference category is drawn titular members. 
***: p < 0.01;  **: p < 0.05;  *: p < 0.1.
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Table A4 Probability of being put forward by the electoral commission and probability of hav-
ing one’s PhD advisor drawn for the electoral commission
Put forward by EC Advisor drawn in EC
Variables 1
(Logit)
2
(OLS)
3
(Logit)
4
(OLS)
Woman –0.268
(0.164)
–0.028*
(0.016)
–0.1190
(0.4910)
–0.0060
(0.0850)
Born outside France –0.434**
(0.201)
–0.042**
(0.019)
–0.1520
(0.7020)
–0.0130
(0.1090)
École Normale  
Supérieure alumni
0.574***
(0.222)
0.093***
(0.032)
0.8290
(0.9250)
0.1520
(0.1580)
Agrégation (High  
School professor 
exam)
0.491**
(0.206)
0.052*
(0.026)
–0.2440
(0.9680)
–0.0250
(0.1590)
Already member of  
the EHESS
0.930***
(0.172)
0.124***
(0.022)
–0.6310
(0.7000)
–0.1490
(0.1410)
Age –0.045***
(0.013)
–0.005***
(0.001)
–0.0003
(0.0450)
0.0002
(0.0090)
Anthropology 0.210
(0.222)
0.021
(0.025)
0.4630
(0.9620)
0.0740
(0.1370)
History 0.291*
(0.165)
0.031
(0.019)
0.5220
(0.7490)
0.0890
(0.1170)
Sociology 0.011
(0.221)
–0.009
(0.023)
0.4010
(0.9160)
0.0660
(0.1340)
Economics 0.095
(0.272)
0.008
(0.031)
0.6630
(1.3110)
0.0810
(0.2400)
Number of previous 
trials
0.487***
(0.173)
0.058***
(0.018)
–0.5250
(0.6220)
–0.0860
(0.1070)
Square number of  
previous trials
–0.034
(0.026)
–0.004
(0.003)
0.1050
(0.1090)
0.0200
(0.0180)
Number of publica-
tions
0.018***
(0.004)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.0150
(0.0330)
0.0020
(0.0040)
Competitive exam 
fixed effects
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
Field All competitive 
exams
All competitive 
exams
All competitive 
exams. Applications 
with advisor at 
EHESS drawn or 
undrawn
All competitive 
exams. Applications 
with advisor at 
EHESS drawn or 
undrawn
N 2,171 2,171 418 418
Note: The probability of being put forward is modeled both through a logistic regression (column 1) and 
an OLS regression. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. The reference category is Ex 
officio members (member of the bureau or the scientific council). 
***: p < 0.01;  **: p < 0.05;  *: p < 0.1.
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Table A6 Applications put forward by electoral commission depending on the membership of 
the electoral commission
1 2 3 4 5 6
Applications whose PhD advisor is
Randomly 
drawn member 
of the EC
0.707**
(0.295)
0.736**
(0.359)
1.082***
(0.379)
1.251***
(0.463)
1.253**
(0.520)
0.827
(0.546)
Ex officio  
member  
of the EC
0.320
(0.405)
0.168
(0.509)
0.420
(0.616)
0.019
(0.899)
0.232
(0.728)
1.222
(1.088)
Member of  
EHESS
0.272
(0.177)
0.403**
(0.193)
0.202
(0.271)
0.133
(0.294)
0.169
(0.376)
0.257
(0.374)
Competitive 
exam fixed ef-
fects
 
No
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Yes
Field All com-
petitive 
exams
All com-
petitive 
exams
All ex-
perimental 
exams 
All experi-
mental 
exams with 
composition
Assistant 
professor 
experimen-
tal exams
Professor 
experimen-
tal exams
Number of 
applications  
[n1; n2]
2,209
[357; 62]
2,209
[357; 62]
991
[184; 55]
749
[143; 42]
563
[131; 33]
428
[53; 22]
Note: Logistic regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. n1 represents the number 
of applicants whose advisor was eligible but not drawn in the electoral commission, n2, the number of ap-
plicants whose advisor was drawn in the electoral commissions. Field: experimental exams with both treated 
(n2 > 0) and control applications (n1 > 0).
***: p < 0.01;  **: p < 0.05;  *: p < 0.1.
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